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Abstract
Introduction When serious medication errors (ME) are identified, communication to the field may be necessary. In the EU, 
communication of serious safety issues, such as medication errors associated with adverse drug reactions, is done through 
direct healthcare professional communications (DHPCs). We aimed to identify how often DHPCs about medication errors 
are distributed, and we explored factors associated with these ME DHPCs.
Methods We performed a descriptive study of all centrally authorised products (CAPs) approved before 1 May 2019 in the 
EU. All DHPCs issued between 1 January 2001 and 1 May 2019 were reviewed for ME content. Characteristics of CAPs 
were collected from the website of the European Medicines Agency. A Kaplan–Meier survival analysis was performed to 
estimate the 5- and 10-year probability of the occurrence of a first ME DHPC. A logistic regression was performed to explore 
risk factors for ME DHPCs.
Results A total of 678 CAPs were included, of which 35 required an ME DHPC during the study period. The 5-year prob-
ability for a CAP to have a first ME DHPC was 2.5% (95% CI 1.1–3.9) and the 10-year probability was 4.4% (95% CI 2.2–6.5). 
Among products with an ME DHPC, the 5-year probability of a second ME DHPC was 21.3% (95% CI 0.2–38.0). The risk 
of ME DHPCs was increased for products with multiple pharmaceutical formulations, enteral liquid or parenteral injection 
preparations, and products classified as nervous system agents or antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents.
Conclusions The absolute number of ME DHPCs for CAPs is low and does not give rise to immediate concern. We identi-
fied potential risk factors for ME DHPCs that should be taken into account during approval procedures or line extensions.
Key Points 
The probability for a centrally authorised medicinal 
product in the EU to have a medication error DHPC 
within 5 and 10 years after authorisation is low (2.5% 
and 4.4%, respectively).
Products with multiple pharmaceutical formulations, 
enteral liquid or parenteral injection preparations, and 
products classified as nervous system agents or antineo-
plastic and immunomodulating agents have an increased 
risk of requiring a medication error DHPC.
Electronic supplementary material The online version of this 
article (https ://doi.org/10.1007/s4026 4-020-00995 -4) contains 
supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.
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1 Introduction
Medication errors and unsafe medication practices have 
been identified as an important cause for avoidable harm 
worldwide, with an estimated global cost of US$42 billion 
annually [1]. Medication errors can occur at any stage of 
the treatment process. Measures to minimise the risk of 
medication errors should be developed by pharmaceuti-
cal companies before the product reaches the market. This 
can be done, for example, with the use of a unique product 
name to limit product name confusion or clear packaging 
to limit look-a-like confusion [2]. The European Medicines 
Agency (EMA) has released guidance on risk minimisation 
of medication errors that can be used both pre-marketing and 
post-marketing [3]. Since 2012, all new products authorised 
in the European Union (EU) should develop a risk man-
agement plan (RMP) as part of the application procedure 
[4, 5]. In this RMP the Marketing Authorisation Holder 
(MAH) should discuss the potential for medication errors 
and the need for risk minimisation measures [6]. Routine 
risk minimisation measures may consist of, for example, 
clear packaging or instructions in the patient leaflet, or pack 
size limitation. In specific situations, regulators can request 
additional risk minimisation measures from pharmaceuti-
cal companies to minimise the risk of medication errors. 
However, not all risks for medication errors are foreseen 
during the development phase. A number of factors may 
play a role in the occurrence of medication errors in clinical 
practice, for example, confusion with other products on the 
market, confusion between pharmaceutical formulations, or 
shortages of products, resulting in the use of replacement 
drugs. These errors are only identified when the product is 
on the market.
When serious medication errors are identified (i.e. medi-
cation errors with serious adverse drug reactions), com-
munication of these risks to the field may be necessary. In 
the EU, Direct Healthcare Professional Communications 
(DHPCs) provide communication of important safety issues 
to the field [7]. A DHPC is a letter containing information 
on “new information about a previously known or unknown 
risk of a medicine which has or could have an impact on a 
medicine’s risk–benefit balance and its condition of use” 
[7]. In addition, it should contain recommendations to the 
healthcare professional (HCP) on how to deal with the 
safety concern, which could include recommendations on 
how to avoid medication errors [7]. DHPCs for centrally 
authorised products (CAPs) are discussed by the Pharma-
covigilance Risk Assessment Committee (PRAC) and/or the 
Committee for Medicinal Products for Human Use (CHMP). 
A DHPC will be prepared by the MAH after receiving a 
request from the regulatory agency. The DHPC is prepared 
through cooperation between the MAH and regulators, and 
is usually disseminated by MAHs, after both parties have 
agreed on the content. When medication errors are identified 
post-marketing, a DHPC may be disseminated; however, if 
a potential risk for medication errors is identified before or 
at the time of approval, a DHPC may be disseminated at the 
time of launch as a risk minimisation measure. However, if a 
new strength or formulation of an already marketed product 
is introduced that may lead to confusion and an ME, a DHPC 
at the time of this introduction might be necessary.
There is currently only limited knowledge on the factors 
influencing the occurrence of DHPCs for medication errors. 
This study aims to identify the number of medication errors 
that required communication via DHPCs. We also explored 
factors associated with the dissemination of DHPCs specifi-
cally regarding the risk of medication errors.
2  Methods
We designed a descriptive study of all CAPs. The study 
period to identify DHPCs ranged from 1 January 2001 to 
30 June 2019. All CAPs authorised before 1 May 2019 were 
included unless they were not originator CAPs (innovative 
products with a new active substance).
2.1  Data Collection and Covariates
Further information on the CAPs was extracted from pub-
licly available information on the website of the European 
Medicines Agency (https ://www.ema.europ a.com). The 
website provides structured information on all authorised 
CAPs, including active substance, Anatomical Therapeu-
tic Chemical (ATC) code, authorisation status (authorised, 
refused, suspended, withdrawn), legal basis (generic, bio-
similar, conditional approval, exceptional circumstances, 
accelerated assessment, orphan medicine), status of addi-
tional monitoring (yes/no) and date of authorisation. The 
legal basis was obtained from the European Public Assess-
ment Report (EPAR) or the application form for the applica-
tion procedure.1 If no information regarding legal basis of 
the product authorisation could be retrieved, these products 
were excluded from further analysis. Date of withdrawal 
and reason for withdrawal were obtained from the public 
statement on withdrawal of the products, which is available 
on the EMA website. Pharmaceutical form(s) and number 
of pharmaceutical forms were collected for each product 
1 Possible legal basis for a medicinal product in the EU: 8.3 Full or 
full-mixed application, 8.3 (multiple), 10a Well established use appli-
cation, 10b Fixed dose combination, 10c Informed consent applica-
tion, 10(1) Generic medicinal product application, 10(3) Hybrid 
medicinal product application, 10(4) Similar biologic product appli-
cation.
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from the EPAR—All Authorised presentations, which is 
available on the EMA website. Products were classified 
based on administration route (see supplementary table in 
the electronic supplementary material [ESM] for categorisa-
tion). For products with an RMP at the time of application, 
information on the safety specification was collected, includ-
ing if medication errors were included as a safety concern 
(important identified risk, important potential risk, missing 
information or not classified), and whether additional risk 
minimisation measures for medication errors were applica-
ble. RMPs were obtained from the initial application dossier. 
From all included DHPCs, information was collected on the 
type of medication error and the source of information that 
triggered the DHPC. Further, DHPCs were categorised by 
response type (reactive and preventive). DHPCs were reac-
tive when they were disseminated post-marketing (e.g. in 
response to an occurring safety issue) and preventive when 
they were disseminated at product launch.
2.2  Exclusion Criteria
CAPs that were not originator products were excluded from 
the analysis, as they are in general expected to follow the 
originator in the dissemination of DHPCs. Inclusion of these 
products would therefore dilute the potential associations 
between product characteristics and DHPC dissemination.
2.3  Outcome
Our main outcome was the occurrence of a DHPC that was 
issued between 1 January 2001 and 30 June 2019 for medi-
cation errors (ME DHPC), which was defined as a DHPC 
describing unintended failure in the drug treatment pro-
cess that led to, or had the potential to lead to, harm to the 
patient.2 Follow-up time was defined as time from authorisa-
tion to first ME DHPC, withdrawal or end of study period, 
whichever came first.
2.4  Data Analysis
Descriptive statistics were used for the characteristics of the 
CAPs. Kaplan–Meier survival analysis was performed to 
estimate the 5- and 10-year probability of the occurrence of 
a first DHPC for medication errors with and without stratifi-
cation for ME category. For the Kaplan–Meier survival anal-
ysis, follow-up time was defined as the time from authorisa-
tion to DHPC, and the denominator was all CAPs authorised 
after 2000. A sensitivity analysis investigated the 5-year 
probability for a first ME DHPC before and after 2012. For 
products with an ME DHPC, the 5- and 10-year probability 
of the occurrence of a second ME DHPC was calculated. 
A median time to ME DHPC was calculated based only on 
products for which ME DHPCs were distributed. Odds ratios 
were calculated for different exposure categories using logis-
tic regression. All data were processed in Microsoft Excel 
and analysed using R version 3.6.1 (packages used: glm, 
survival, dplyr, tidyr).
3  Results
A total of 1311 CAPs were authorised in the European 
Economic Area (EEA) before 1 May 2019. Of the 1311 
products, 633 applications were excluded as they did 
not concern applications for new originator products 
(Fig. 1). The 678 originator CAPs authorised in the EEA 
were included for the analysis. In total, 319 DHPCs were 
issued for these CAPs during the study period, of which 
35 DHPCs (11.0%, 95% CI 7.8–14.9) concerned medica-
tion errors (ME DHPCs). The rate of ME DHPCs issued 
per year ranged between zero and five and the propor-
tion of ME DHPCs over all DHPCs fluctuated between 
0.0% and 23.5% per year during the entire study period 
(Fig. 2). The 35 ME DHPCs were issued for 28 CAPs, 
which corresponds to 4.1% of 678 CAPs authorised before 
1 May 2019 and included in this study. Among all CAPs, 
the 5-year probability for a medical substance to have 
a first ME DHPCs was 2.5% (95% CI 1.1–3.9) and the 
10-year probability was 4.4% (95% CI 2.2–6.5). A sensi-
tivity analysis to evaluate the 5-year probability for a CAP 
to have a first ME DHPC before and after 2012 showed 
that CAPs authorised before 2012 had a 2.4% (95% CI 
Fig. 1  Exclusion of non-originator products authorised in the EU dur-
ing the study period
2 Refer to the European Medicines Agency’s definition of medication 
errors as described in the Good practice guide on recording, coding, 
reporting and assessment of medication errors.
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0.6–4.1) probability for a CAP to have a first ME DHPC 
after 5 years. For CAPs authorised after 2012, this was 
3.1% (95% CI 0.1–5.9). Among the 28 CAPs for which ME 
DHPCs were issued, one CAP was withdrawn before the 
end of the study period for commercial reasons. For prod-
ucts with an ME DHPC, the median time from approval 
to DHPC was 5.2 years (range 0.7–19.2). The ME DHPC 
issued earliest after approval (0.7 years) was for tenect-
eplase  (Metalyse®, Boehringer Ingelheim), concerning the 
risk of dosing errors if the product was not used correctly. 
The ME DHPC that was sent out the longest after market-
ing approval (19.2 years) was for cetrorelix  (Cetrotide®, 
Merck) and was based on spontaneous reports describing a 
risk of administration of non-sterile product due to incor-
rect use of a newly introduced syringe.
3.1  Second/Third DHPC
For six CAPs, a second ME DHPC was issued between 
0.9 and 8.3 years after the first DHPC. Among products 
with an ME DHPC, the 5-year probability of a second ME 
DHPC was 21.3% (95% CI 0.2–38.0). In two cases, the sec-
ond DHPC concerned the same safety issue. For one CAP 
(levetiracetam  [Keppra®, UCB Pharma]) a third DHPC was 
issued 6.3 years after the second DHPC. All three DHPCs 
for this product concerned different medication error issues.
Fig. 2  Yearly number of 
Direct Healthcare Professional 
Communications for Centrally 
Authorised Products communi-




















Table 1  Types of medication errors discussed in Direct Healthcare Professional Communications
The 5-year and 10-year probability for error categories were calculated including only products for which an ME DHPC had been disseminated
CAPs centrally authorised products, DHPC Direct Healthcare Professional Communication, ME medication error, NA not applicable, PM post-
marketing
a One DHPC was based on both PM safety reports and clinical trial data and was counted twice
b For the Kaplan–Meier survival analysis, only the CAPs authorised after 2000 were included. As a result, seven CAPs were excluded from this 
analysis
Error category Data source N (%) 5-year probability of 
ME DHPC (95% CI)b
10-year probability of 
ME DHPC (95% CI)b
Confusion due to changes to the product PM safety reports [3]
Preventive [6]
PM complaints [1]
10 (28.6) 0.67 (0.00–0.89) 0.83 (0.00–0.97)
Confusion due to unclear information/packaging PM safety reports [2]
Preventive [2]
4 (11.4) 0.00 (NA–NA) 1.00 (NA–NA)
Confusion with other formulations/strengths/products PM safety reports [2]
Preventive [4]
6 (17.1) 0.60 (0.00–0.86) 0.80 (0.00–0.97)
Inappropriate use of product with quality issue PM complaints [4] 4 (11.4) 0.33 (0.00–0.70) 0.33 (0.00–0.70)
Non-adherence to instructions PM safety  reportsa [6]
Clinical trial  dataa [1]
Observational study [1]
PM complaints [1]
8 (22.9) 0.43 (0.00–0.70) 0.86 (0.12–0.98)
Other PM safety reports [2]
Unclear [1]
3 (8.6) 0.33 (0.00–0.70) 1.00 (NA–NA)
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3.2  Medication Error Categories
The 35 ME DHPCs issued were most frequently related to 
confusion due to changes to the product (29%), non-adher-
ence to instructions (23%), and confusion with other for-
mulations, strengths or products from the same marketing 
authorisation (17%) (Table 1). Confusion due to changes to 
the product was most frequently related to confusion at the 
level of HCPs (n = 8/10), and less frequently at the level of 
the patient (n = 5/10). For example, with the introduction of 
a new oral levetiracetam dosing system (from a syringe with 
milligrams to a syringe with millilitres), it was important to 
inform both HCPs and patients about the potential confusion 
between the old and the new system (supplementary table, 
see ESM). Examples of ME DHPCs specifically targeting 
HCPs were for radium-223 dichloride  (Xofigo®, Bayer AG) 
and moroctocog alfa (ReFacto  AF®, Pfizer). The reference 
standard was revised for these products, which introduced 
a risk of incorrect dosing (supplementary table, see ESM). 
Confusion with other formulations, strengths or products 
was more often related to the level of patients (n = 5/6) than 
HCPs (n = 4/6). Confusion due to unclear product informa-
tion or packaging occurred more often at the level of HCPs 
(n = 4/4) than patients (n = 1/4). Among products with an 
ME DHPC, errors due to confusion as a result of changes 
to the product, unclear information/packaging or confusion 
with other formulations/strengths/products were communi-
cated fastest with a 5-year probability of 50% (Table 1). ME 
DHPCs were categorised as reactive or preventive DHPCs 
based on source of information. The majority of ME DHPCs 
were issued post-marketing and were triggered by sponta-
neous reports, product complaints, clinical trials or obser-
vational studies (n = 24). Twelve ME DHPCs were issued 
at approval to prevent potential anticipated MEs (Table 1). 
Preventive ME DHPCs were disseminated to communicate 
the potential risk of confusion as a result of changes to the 
products, unclear information/packaging or confusion with 
other formulations/strengths/products. The most common 
errors described in preventive ME DHPCs were the risk of 
incorrect dosing due to the introduction of new batches with 
a new reference standard (n = 3), risk of confusion between 
two available formulations or strengths (n = 3) and risk of 
dosing due to availability of dosing information based on 
the salt form and information based on the active substance 
(n = 2) (supplementary table, see ESM).
3.3  Drug Class
The majority of CAPs for which ME DHPCs were sent out 
concerned antineoplastic and immunomodulating agents 
(n = 10, 34.5%), followed by medicines targeting the nerv-
ous system (n = 5, 17.2%) and medicines targeting blood 
and blood-forming organs (n = 4, 13.8%) (Table 2). We 
observed increased odds of an ME DHPC for antineo-
plastic and immunomodulating agents (OR 7.99; 95% CI 
1.39–49.77) and for nervous systems medication (OR 8.31; 
95% CI 1.66–38.57) compared with anti-infectives for sys-
temic use (Table 2). A high variety of types of errors and 
their consequences was observed within drug classes (see 
supplementary table in the ESM). An example of a risk for 
an immunomodulating agent was confusion between the 
dosing schedule of tacrolimus  (Advagraf®, Astellas Pharma 
Europe) and tacrolimus  (Prograft®, Astellas Pharma), both 
indicated for prophylaxis of transplant rejection in adult 
kidney or liver allograft recipients. These products con-
tain the same active substance, but have a different dosing 
scheme. Confusion between these schedules may lead to 
acute transplant rejection or toxicity due to overdose. All 
risks for other products are described in the supplementary 
table (see ESM).
3.4  Approval Procedure
CAPs authorised with exceptional circumstances, with 
conditional approval or as an orphan drug did not have an 
increased risk of an ME DHPC (Table 2). None of the prod-
ucts in our dataset were approved through an accelerated 
assessment procedure.
3.5  Risk Management Plan
Among the 678 included CAPs, 72.0% had an RMP at the 
time of authorisation (Table 2). For CAPs with an RMP at 
the time of marketing authorisation, CAPs with ME safety 
concerns in the RMP had a higher chance of requiring an 
ME DHPC during post-marketing than CAPs without ME 
safety concerns in the RMP, although this was not statisti-
cally significant (OR 1.97; 95% CI 0.44–8.72). CAPs with-
out RMP had higher odds for an ME DHPC than CAPs 
with an RMP without ME safety concerns (OR 3.53; 95% 
CI 1.22–10.22) (Table 2). CAPs with an RMP at registration 
had a 5-year probability of a first ME DHPC of 2.4% (95% 
CI 0.8–3.9), whereas CAPs without an RMP at registration 
had a 5-year probability of a first ME DHPC of 2.8% (95% 
CI 0.0–5.9). For all four products with ME safety concerns 
in the RMP and an ME DHPC, the safety concern was the 
same as the ME discussed in the DHPC (Table 3). In addi-
tion, two of the four products already had educational mate-
rial implemented to minimise the risk of the medication 
errors addressed in the DHPC.
3.6  Pharmaceutical Formulation
The risk of an ME DHPC was significantly increased for 
products with two (OR 16.74; 95% CI 1.80–155.57) or three 
different pharmaceutical formulations (OR 222.65; 95% CI 
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Table 2  Univariate and multivariate analysis of factors associated with disseminated ME DHPCs
The column total contains percentages of all CAPs per category; the column CAPs with ME DHPCs contains percentages of the total CAPs with 
and without ME DHPCs in the corresponding group
Odds ratios presented bold are statistically significant
CAPs centrally authorised products, DHPC Direct Healthcare Professional Communication, EU European Union, ME medication error, RMP 
risk management plan
Characteristic Total N = 678 
(% of all 
CAPs)
CAPs with ME 
DHPC (% of 
total)
N = 29 (4.3%)
Univariate 
odds ratio





 A—alimentary tract and 
metabolism
84 2 (2.4) 1.07 0.17–6.51 3.29 0.42–25.58
 B—blood and blood-form-
ing organs
55 4 (7.3) 3.42 0.74–15.84 5.49 0.90–33.31
 C—cardiovascular system 28 0 (0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 D—dermatologicals 10 0 (0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 G—genitourinary system 
and sex hormones
23 0 (0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 H—systemic hormonal 
preparations, excluding sex 
hormones and insulins
11 1 (9.1) 4.37 0.42–45.91 6.19 0.47–80.91
 J—anti-infectives for sys-
temic use
134 3 (2.2) 1.00 Reference 1.00 Reference
 L—antineoplastic and 
immunomodulating agents*
179 10 (5.6) 2.58 0.70–9.58 7.99 1.66–38.57
 M—musculoskeletal system 20 1 (5.0) 2.30 0.23–23.24 1.46 0.09–23.15
 N—nervous system 53 5 (9.4) 4.55 1.05–19.76 8.31 1.39–49.77
 P—antiparasitic products, 
insecticides and repellents
1 0 (0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 R—respiratory system 19 0 (0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 S—sensory organs 22 1 (4.5) 2.08 0.21–20.94 6.13 0.32–117.20
 V—various 36 1 (2.8) 1.25 0.13–12.37 0.95 0.07–13.67
 NYA—not yet assigned 3 0 (0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Orphan drug (yes) 117 (17.3) 1 (0.9) 0.17 0.02–1.27 0.12 0.01–1.27
Conditional approval (yes) 20 (2.9) 1 (5.0) 1.23 0.16–9.53 5.86 0.47–72.81
Exceptional circumstances 
(yes)
27 (4.0) 0 (0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ME as safety concern in EU RMP
 Yes 111 (16.4) 4 (3.6) 1.98 0.57–6.88 1.97 0.44–8.72
 No 377 (55.6) 7 (1.9) 1.00 Reference 1.00 Reference
 No RMP 190 (28.0) 17(8.9) 5.19 2.12–12.76 3.53 1.22–10.22
Type of administration
 Topical 30 (4.4) 0 (0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Parenteral (through injec-
tions)
291 (42.9) 13 (4.5) 10.24 1.33–78.89 10.29 1.23–86.38
 Parenteral (other) 18 (2.7) 0 (0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
 Enteral (solid) 220 (32.4) 1 (0.5) 1.00 Reference 1.00 Reference
 Enteral (liquid) 15 (2.2) 1 (6.7) 15.64 0.93–263.48 53.09 2.50–1126.01
 Other 16 (2.4) 2 (12.5) 31.29 2.67–366.38 56.77 2.90–1112.33
 Missing 3 (0.4) 1 (33.3) 109.50 4.92–2435.06 69.73 2.46–1972.78
 Two formulations 73 (1.0) 6 (8.2) 19.61 2.32–165.80 16.74 1.80–155.57
 Three formulations 11 (1.6) 4 (36.4) 125.14 12.34–1269.50 222.65 15.00–3305.16
 Four formulations 1 (0.1) 0 (0.0) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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15.00–3305.16) compared with products with only a solid 
enteral formulation (Table 2). In total, ten ME DHPCs in 
our dataset were for products with multiple formulations. 
Review of the ME risks showed that in four of the ten cases, 
the ME risk was directly related to the existence of multiple 
formulations. An example is the confusion between tablets 
and suspension formulations of posaconazole  (Noxafil®, 
Merck Sharp and Dohme). Posaconazole is prescribed for 
the treatment of infections. The DHPC informed HCPs that 
the oral suspension and tablets are not interchangeable, and 
direct substitution without recalculation of the dose could 
lead to underdose or overdose. The type of pharmaceutical 
formulation also influenced the odds of an ME DHPC. The 
chance of an ME DHPC significantly increased (OR 10.29; 
95% CI 01.23–86.38) for products with a parenteral injection 
and (OR 53.09; 95% CI 2.50–1126.01) for products with an 
enteral liquid formulation.
4  Discussion
CAPs authorised before 1 May 2019 had a 5-year probability 
of 2.5% (95% CI 1.1–3.9) and 10-year probability of 4.4% 
(95% CI 2.2–6.5) to have a first ME DHPC. The sensitivity 
analysis showed no difference in 5-year probability before 
and after 2012. However, the numbers are small and limit 
firm conclusions. Spontaneous reports were most often the 
source for ME DHPCs. Mol et al. observed a rate of 6.5% 
ME DHPCs among DHPCs issued in the Netherlands [8]. 
In that study, national and decentralised products were also 
included and therefore cannot be used as a direct compari-
son. While ME-related harm is a large concern in clinical 
practice, our study shows that only in a limited number of 
cases a DHPC is required. This suggests that the prevention 
of ME remains challenging and requires involvement and 
efforts of all stakeholders.
We demonstrated that the type and number of pharmaceu-
tical formulations as well as the class of drug are important 
risk factors for a product to have an ME DHPC after mar-
keting. Products with parenteral injections, enteral liquids 
or multiple formulations had a significantly higher risk of 
requiring an ME DHPC than products with only an enteral 
solid formulation. Parenteral injections and enteral liquids 
required more preparation steps like measuring liquids, dis-
solving and diluting and the administration is often more 
complex. The increased risk of medication errors with use 
of parenteral injections is also supported by Valentin et al., 
who observed that more severely ill patients had a higher 
risk of medication errors, which can be explained by the 
fact that these patients require more complex care and use 
more parenteral medication [9]. Half of the medication error 
safety issues for enteral liquid products concerned wrong 
administration in children. Oral liquids in children have been 
listed before as a risk factor for medication errors [10–12]. 
The doses are often dependent on the size and weight of 
the child and need to be measured individually. In addition, 
measurements through dosing syringes may cause confusion 
to caregivers or healthcare professionals [10–12]. Moreover, 
our data show that there were multiple issues with syringes 
due to introduction of new measuring scales, confusion 
between milligrams and millilitres or fading of the meas-
uring scales. Having different formulations for a product 
increased the risk of an ME DHPC. At licensure, a clear 
benefit–risk assessment should be made to evaluate whether 
additional formulations really benefit the patient. An exam-
ple that shows how the benefit–risk balance may deviate per 
formulation is dextropropoxyphene (although not related to 
medication errors). During the dextropropoxyphene referral 
in 2006–2008, there was an evaluation of the benefit risk of 
dextropropoxyphene in the light of potential abuse resulting 
in fatal overdose. During this referral it was decided that the 
product was suspended for all formulations except IV for-
mulations (which are only administered in hospitals), since 
these had no abuse potential.
Anti-neoplastic and immunomodulating agents and nerv-
ous system agents received significantly more ME DHPCs 
compared with anti-infectives for systemic use. In the EEA, 
medication errors are frequently reported for nervous system 
products and antineoplastic products [13]. Antineoplastic 
agents were mostly parenteral injections (70%) and 20% of 
antineoplastic agents had two formulations marketed.
All five nervous system products that required an ME 
DHPC had an enteral liquid formulation marketed and four 
of the five products had multiple formulations marketed. It 
could be hypothesised that errors with this type of product 
have more severe consequences and therefore more often 
require a DHPC, since DHPCs are only disseminated if the 
ME would lead to severe adverse events. This is supported 
by the fact that medication errors for these products are 
often reported to EudraVigilance, where only medication 
errors that resulted in adverse events have to be reported 
[13]. However, to confirm this, other data is required such as 
medication errors that did not need a DHPC, information on 
near misses and medication errors without adverse events.
Type of errors for antineoplastic agents and nervous sys-
tem products were of varying nature and no particular pat-
tern was observed for drug classes.
4.1  Other Observations
In total, 11 products authorised with an RMP required an 
ME DHPC. Interestingly, we found that for all four CAPs 
with medication error safety concerns in the RMP and an 
ME DHPC, the safety concern was the same as included 
in the DHPC. On the one hand, this shows that medication 
errors can be predicted. The majority of these DHPCs (3/4) 
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concerned introduction of a new formulation or strength 
that could lead to confusion with already marketed prod-
ucts. Therefore, these risks were relatively easy to antici-
pate. However, it also shows that the measures implemented 
at authorisation were not sufficient to minimise the risk of 
medication errors enough, even though additional risk mini-
misation measures were in place for these risks in two of the 
four CAPs. This raises questions about the effectiveness of 
these measures. Furthermore, for seven CAPs the risk was 
not foreseen, even though there was an RMP in place. The 
type of error was much more varied for these seven CAPs 
and was often related to confusion due to changes to the 
product or due to unclear information/packaging. Since these 
changes to the product occurred post-marketing, unsurpris-
ingly these risks were not foreseen during development of 
the RMP before marketing. Unclear product information or 
packaging, however, is a factor that could be evaluated and 
foreseen before marketing through human factor testing as 
recommended in the Good practice guide on risk minimisa-
tion and prevention of medication errors [14].
4.1.1  Time to DHPC
The time to ME DHPC was highly variable. Errors that were 
related to confusion around the product (e.g. unclear prod-
uct information) were identified more rapidly than errors 
related to quality issues or errors related to non-adherence 
(an example of a quality issue is fading of measurement lines 
on a syringe, which may lead to dosing errors). A reason 
could be that medication error risks due to quality issues 
can be detected at any time of the product life cycle since 
the quality issue can occur at any time during the product’s 
lifetime. Also, issues related to non-adherence may be intro-
duced later in the product life cycle when HCPs assume 
that they are experienced with the product. Unclear prod-
uct information, on the other hand, might be detected faster 
since it introduces a risk immediately at the start of the mar-
keting period, which is therefore more likely to be detected 
early in the product life cycle.
4.1.2  Repeat DHPCs for One Product
There were six CAPs for which more than one new medica-
tion error issue was identified. For bivalirudin  (Angiox®, 
The Medicines Company UK), an ME DHPC was distrib-
uted twice for the same issue. This raises additional ques-
tions on the effectiveness of the communication and whether 
other additional measures might have been more useful for 
this product (e.g. educational material, stickers on packag-
ing, etc.). No studies were identified in the medical literature 
evaluating the effectiveness of the DHPCs for bivalirudin 
and the product was withdrawn for commercial reasons in 
2018.
5  Limitations
We used a dataset of DHPCs that were distributed in the 
Netherlands regarding centrally authorised products. This 
means that the wording in other countries may be slightly 
different, but the topics are the same. Sending a DHPC 
is the responsibility of the national medicines agency. A 
minor proportion could have been missing in case a CAP 
was not marketed in the Netherlands at the time of DHPC 
distribution, or if the issue was considered not relevant in 
the Netherlands.
DHPCs are only one measure to minimise the risk of 
medication errors, other actions such as changes to the 
Summaries of Product Characteristics (SmPCs) are not 
included in this overview.
DHPCs agreed at marketing approval may be sent over 
a year after the date of marketing approval, as there may 
be a delay in the time of marketing of the product in differ-
ent countries. Time to DHPC may therefore vary slightly 
between countries.
Since data on DHPCs was not systematically collected 
before 2001, we excluded CAPs authorised before 2001 from 
the survival analysis to avoid immortal time bias. Although 
generic products are expected to follow the originator in the 
development of their risk minimisation measures, there are 
situations possible where a medication error risk is specific 
for a generic product. Since we have only included origina-
tors in this study, some cases might be missing.
The small number of DHPCs addressing ME limited 
some of the analyses and interpretation. Although some 
factors were associated with increased or reduced risks of 
ME DHPCs, this should be interpreted cautiously.
Evaluation of the potential adverse events following ME 
was beyond the scope of this study, therefore we cannot 
comment on the severity of medication errors that were 
described in the DHPCs.
6  Conclusion
The absolute number of ME DHPCs for CAPs is low and 
does not give rise to immediate concern. Products with 
multiple pharmaceutical formulations, enteral liquid or 
parenteral injection preparations, and products classified 
as nervous system agents or antineoplastic and immu-
nomodulating agents are at higher risk of an ME DHPC. 
These factors are relevant to take into account during 
approval procedures or line-extension procedures in the 
context of medication errors. Once a product has a DHPC, 
the risk of a repeat DHPC is high, therefore, more effective 
communication may be needed.
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